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Anglo-American copyright law has roots that extend at least back to the privileges 
accorded to the Elizabethan Stationer’s Guild and which have left an enduring mark on current 
copyright law.1  Nearly a quarter century ago, Peter Jaszi and a handful of collaborators 
dramatically changed our understanding of copyright doctrine by recognizing the continuing 
effects of legacy assumptions in current copyright doctrine. 2  Since then, a substantial body of 
scholarship has accumulated applying such insights to the nature of copyright authorship and 
originality.  It has become commonplace, and almost routine in copyright scholarship to 
acknowledge that copyright doctrine incorporates outdated notions of an idealized “romantic 
author” who produces original texts from the force of his own genius.3   
 
Time and technology have moved on since those pioneering observations.  Not only has 
recognition of romanticism become routine, now equally routine is the recognition that such 
assumptions foster an increasingly poor fit between copyright law and new communication 
technologies.4  Such technologies increasingly reveal the role of the reader in creating textual 
meaning.  The role of the romantic author has been increasingly supplanted by recognition of the 
role of the reader, and technologies that empower the reader have accelerated this trend.  
                                                 
  Copyright by Dan L. Burk 
†  Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. 
1  See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993). 
2  See, e.g., James D. A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 
633 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship." 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; 
Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279 (1992); 
David L. Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-
Literate Millennium , 55 L. & CONTEMP PROB. 139 (1992). 
3  For only a handful of  recent examples, see, e.g., Margaret Chon, The Romantic Collective Author, 14 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 829 (2012); Mario Biagioli, Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte's Proof of the Illegality of 
Reprinting, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1847-48 (2011); Lionel Bentley, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty 
to Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2008); Jessica Sibley, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual 
Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 324 (2008); Roberta Kwall, "Author-Stories:" Narrative's Implications for 
Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48 (2001). 
4 For, once again, a very small sample of such observations, see, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, COFIGURING THE 
NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 191 (2012); Jessica Litman,  Real 
Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2010); Ben DePoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect 
of Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831(2009); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE 
THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008); Dan L. Burk, The Mereology of Digital Copyright, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711, 712 (2008); Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of 
Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1803 (2007). 
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Copyright law, it is argued, has neither kept pace with the development of new media nor with 
our changed understanding of authorship.  
 
In fields outside of law, the proliferation of new media has yielded a wealth of new 
scholarship considering the cultural, cognitive, and social dimensions of digital communications.  
But surprisingly little of such work has migrated to illuminate current legal understanding of 
authorship, originality, and related concepts.  The legal academy seems well aware that technical 
progress poses ongoing and additional challenges to old notions of copyright, but the suite of 
tools brought to bear on the problem had remained surprisingly static.   
 
Here I hope to open a new though related thread in the conversation regarding 
copyright’s legacy assumptions, by questioning whether copyright may incorporate increasingly 
untenable expectations regarding narrative, and whether new understandings of narrative offer 
insight into problems arising from such expectations.  As in the case of studies concerning the 
romantic author, such legacy assumptions are increasingly disclosed by their discontinuity with 
the development of new media, which in other settings has led to new views on the nature of 
narrative.  As media and novel forms of expression have evolved over the past several decades, 
so have theories of narrative.  But it is not clear that copyright law has kept pace.  I shall argue 
that the gap between copyright’s embedded assumptions and the evolution of narrative theories 




The New Narratology 
 
Classical analysis of narrative structure, dating back at least to Aristotle, recognized 
causal relationships among the events of a story’s plot as key to a coherent narrative.5  Relational 
coherence lends, in Pooh-Bah’s famous term, “artistic verisimilitude”6 to an internal or diegetic 
world depicted through narrative structure.7  Chief among the causal relationships within a 
narrative has traditionally been temporal sequence.  Typically plot events are arranged as a linear 
progression of action: stories have a beginning, a middle, and an end.   Modern analysts 
elaborated on this framework, recognizing that narrative typically has both a diegetic sequence of 
events within the logic of the story, and a separate sequence in which those story elements are 
presented to the reader.8  Thus one may draw a distinction between story and discourse.9 
Narrative presentation or discourse may start at the middle of the story, it may start at the end of 
the story, it may flash back or flash forward, but the events presented in this manner have their 
own separate temporal relationship. 
 
Strong versions of narrative theory hold that narrative can be translated between different 
media, because narrative entails a conceptual core that transcends any given medium.  Certainly 
                                                 
5 H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 18 (2d ed. 2008) 
6 WILLIAM S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE MIKADO, Act II (1885). 
7 ABBOTT, supra note 5 at 238. 
8  I.d at 17. 




some media are more readily susceptible to narrative analysis than others, and different media 
will impose their own configurations on narrative.  The development of motion picture 
technology, for example, added to narrative analysis a range of film-specific features having to 
do with visual perspective, sequence editing, and viewpoint. Avant-guard and experimental 
authors have attempted to evict narrative from certain types of works.  But as Katherine Hayles 
points out, narrative is surprisingly persistent, in part because it appears fundamental to how 
humans comprehend the world.10 
 
But this does not mean that narrative looks the same in all media.  Over the past two 
decades, discussions of narrative have recognized that the classical formulation of narrative may 
be inadequate to fully analyze even conventional works, and that many literary works may depart 
from the classical expectations regarding elements such as sequence and causality.  It has 
become particularly apparent that digitized new media, such as hypertext, DVDs, and most 
especially computer games either present the opportunity to depart from classical formulations, 
or makes manifest inadequacies long latent in the classical formulation.   
 
The substrate on which a narrative is recorded has always played some mediating role in 
the configuration of the narrative, as well as the response of the reader.  But the mediating effect 
is heightened in automated systems such as current digital technologies.  Each medium has its 
own unique affordances, but unlike vellum or paper or celluloid, digital technologies are 
specifically designed to “behave.”11  Rather than directly recording and generating a narrative, 
design of new media involves the authorship of code – effectively the design of a machine -- that 
in turn generates the narrative.   
 
To a previously unprecedented extent, these characteristics of digital media lend 
themselves to the creation of narratives in conjunction with the reader.  Historically, both the 
coherence of the internal story and the structure of the discursive presentation have been largely 
in the hands of an author.  Yet Barthes distinguished between texts that are lisible and those that 
are scriptible, that is, between texts that appear closed and finished, making the reader a recipient 
of the text; and texts that are open or unfinished, which force the reader to supply missing 
meanings.12  Where digital media is concerned, such reader engagement seems heightened, as in 
the case of computer games, where the process of reading is manifest in the player’s control over 
the progress of the game.  Every engagement with the text becomes a new work, generating 
variations on the basic narrative supplied by the code.   
 
Thus, Friedman notes that it is nearly obligatory in postmodern literary analysis to 
recognize the role of the reader in formulating the meaning of texts, but takes this observation a 
step further.13  He asserts that the reader/user of a video game is engaged with such interactive 
works not so much cooperatively interpreting or re-imagining the text – although the reader may 
indeed be doing that as well -- but the user rather assumes the role of a participant in choosing 
                                                 
10 N. Katherine Hayles, Narrative and Database: Natural Symbionts, 122 PMLA 1603, 1605-06 (2007). 
11 Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2308, 2320 (1994) (characterizing software as a text that “behaves”). 
12 ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z 5 (tr. Richard Miller, 1975) (discussing “readerly,” or lisible, and “writerly,” or scriptible 
texts). 
13 Ted Friedman, Making Sense of Software: Computer Games and Interactive Textuality, CYBERSOCIETY: 
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 73 (1995). 
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the development and direction of the content.14  Other scholars have made similar observations.15  
Espen Aarseth famously situated computer games in a larger genre of “cybertexts” which range 
from script or print to digital.16  He defines such texts as those that require nontrivial effort by 
the user to traverse the text, such that the user adopts a role that is configurative, rather than 
interpretive, as understood by classic narrative theories.  However, such objects seem sufficiently 
far removed from classical narrative that Aarseth and others have called for an entirely separate 
approach that critically regards games on their own terms.17  
 
This has led some commentators to reject narratology, or at least traditional narratology, 
as a method for understanding new media.18  The debate over narrative approaches to computer 
games has become at times particularly sharp,19 but the understanding the terms of the debate is 
helpful in understanding the terms of the copyright inquiry here. Certainly many games 
incorporate into their structures some degree of classical narrativity, internally pointing to both 
analeptic and proleptic events within the game chronology.  But dissenters from narrative 
analyses point to characteristics of new media that they believe are not captured within 
narratology.  For example, the interactivity between the player, content, and technical system 
tends to disrupt the categories of story-time and discourse-time on which traditional narrative 
theory rests.20  Rather, the events experienced through computer games are typically lived rather 
than recounted, so that the sequencing of action is primarily founded on the relationship between 
user-time and event-time.21 
 
Narratologists respond that this is not a relevant distinction, because in any medium, 
narrative seems lived rather than observed, experienced rather than narrated.  Individuals 
engaged in reading, listening, or viewing narrative works typically identify with the internal 
perspective of the narrative.22  The reader experiences narrative mimetically, through the 
formation of mental representations of the events portrayed.23  Were the reader to re-tell the 
story, a recounted, diegetic narrative would be produced.24  Interactive media, like drama, 
engages the player in a type of lived narrative that is experienced but which may also be re-told.  
As Ryan observes “Life is lived prospectively and told retrospectively, but its narrative replay is 
once again lived prospectively.”25 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15  See, e.g., Katherine Hayles, Metaphoric Networks in Lexia to Perplexia in FIRST PERSON: NEW MEDIA AS STORY, 
PERFORMANCE, AND GAME 291, 293 (Noah Wardrip-Fruin & Pat Harrigan, eds., 2004). 
16  ESPEN AARSETH, CYBERTEXTS: PERSPECTIVES ON ERGODIC LITERATURE (1997). 
17 See APHRA KERR, THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL GAMES 29-35 (2006) (reviewing the tensions 
between narrative and ludology studies). 
18  Id. 
19 See Jan Simons, Narrative, Games, and Theory, 7 GAME STUDIES (2007) <http://gamestudies.org/0701/ 
articles/simons > 
20  JASPER JUUL, HALF-REAL: VIDEO GAMES BETWEEN REAL RULES AND FICTIONAL WORLDS 159-60 (2005) 
21  Markku Eskelinen, Towards Computer Game Studies in FIRST PERSON: NEW MEDIA AS STORY, PERFORMANCE, 
AND GAME 36, 37 (2004). 
22 See Simons, supra note 23. 
23 Marie-Laure Ryan, Beyond Myth and Metaphor: The Case of Narrative in Digital Media, 1 GAME STUDIES, 
(2001) < http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/ryan/ > 
24 Id. 
25 MARIE-LAURE RYAN, NARRATIVE AS VIRTUAL REALITY: IMMERSION AND INTERACTIVITY IN LITERATURE AND 




But observations regarding the immersive nature of narrative texts lead to an additional 
line of critique.  Narrative critics have observed that users of cybertexts are ontologically 
separated from the text.26   Unlike the relatively seamless mimetic experience of standard texts, 
where a reader or viewer is caught up in the “secondary world,” the necessity of making choices 
to direct the computer output, as well as tactile interactions with the physical interface device 
continually remind the reader of the separation between herself and the text.  At the same time, it 
seems clear digital texts can be immersive, highly diegetic experience to the user.  Computer 
gamers routinely think of themselves as acting “within” the visual depiction of the graphics; they 
typically identify with an avatar or other representation within the game output. 
 
These peculiar narrative characteristics of new media have prompted a search for new 
narrative categories, particularly outside the analysis of computer games.  Manovich argues that 
the term narrative is inappropriately applied to new media “to cover up the fact that we have not 
yet developed a language to describe these strange new objects.” Viewing the new media 
landscape and the changes that have come to narrative forms, Manovich concludes that the new 
fundamental form of information in the current age is the database. 27  By this he means that texts 
are presented to readers or users as collections of objects, on which they can perform various 
algorithmic operations.28 
 
Manovich styles the logics of database and narrative as incompatible antagonists.29 At 
one time classic narratives structured information, now the relationships defining data retrieval 
do so, and the struggle between these two forms of relational ordering explains the strange nature 
of many new media objects.  But Katherine Hayles argues instead that these are in fact natural 
symbionts.30  Narratives she says are dependent upon databases in order to exist in digital media, 
but at the same time databases require narrative for interpretation and infusion of meaning.31 
 
 Manovich’s recognition of new media as founded on database structuring may also define 
the nature of digitally scriptable texts.  Unlike the readers of more static traditional media, users 
of a digitized work trace any of a number of trajectories through the database, pursuing the 
relational linkages between digital objects.  Digitized works thus lend themselves to multiple 
narratives.  The composite of such paths Manovich terms hypernarrative: the summation of the 
possible narrative variations that may be derived from the work.32  The choice of paths lies with 
the user, according to the algorithms or affordances provided by the code.  Thus the user is 
admittedly constrained by the relationships established by the coder, but in complex works such 
as video games, the possible number of paths through the hypernarrative is, if not infinite, at 
least astronomical. 
 
                                                 
26  Lev Manovich, Database as a Symbolic Form, 34 MILLENNIUM FILM J. (1999). 
27  Lev Manovich, Database as a Genre of New Media, 14 AI & SOC. 176 (2000). 
28  Id. at 177. 
29  LEV MANOVICH, THE LANGUAGE OF NEW MEDIA 228 (2001). 
30 See Hayles, supra note 10; N. KATHERINE HAYLES, HOW WE THINK: DIGITAL MEDIA AND CONTEMPORARY 
TECHNOGENESIS 176 (2012). 
31 Id.  
32 MANOVICH, supra note 33 at 227. 
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 The shape and numerosity of such paths is – like all human experience – subject to causal 
and material constraints.  The hypernarrative is constructed of only the type and number of paths 
that the programmer has provided.  Programming choices, as well as their execution, is 
constrained by the affordances of the hardware on which the code is executed.  The performance 
of any given pathway is ultimately determined by the materiality of the system – the resilience of 
a keyboard, the firing of neurons, the ratcheting of sarcomeres, the speed of electron transfer 
across a computer bus.33  As in any medium, the reader is free to re-define the work in her own 
mind, outside of such constraints, but in new media the affordances of the underlying database 
typically allow a hypernarrative range within the discursive structure of the work. 
 
 These models also extend to other forms of digital media.  While much of this debate 
centers on computer gaming, commentators have noted that similar convergences are found to a 
greater or lesser extent in other new media.  For example, consumer DVD systems placed into 
the hands of viewers a new kind of control over video output.34  Most video works committed to 
DVD, such as theater release motion pictures, were filmed and edited so as to present to the 
viewer a linear narrative over time.  However, the technical affordances of consumer DVD 
systems allows viewers to skip forward and back in the content a video work, to choose the order 
for viewing segments of the video work, to freeze action on the screen, repeat content, and 
otherwise re-arrange chunks of the work.35  These are to some extent subject to the direction of 
the producer, who can specify “Prohibited User Options” (PUO) that restrict the available control 
of the viewer, requiring certain scenes to be viewed, or denying instructions to fast forward 
through portions of the recording.36 
 
Narratologists have also noted that the DVD format allows the core work to come packed 
with a variety of “add-ons,” including scenes cut from the theatrical release, interviews with 
directors or actors, and voice over narratives accompanying the playback of the core video 
work.37  Many of these added features are commentaries or paratexts that frame the core work or 
instruct the viewer how to approach it.  Thus the viewer became in some sense the co-creator of 
the video narrative, potentially choosing output in different order than that specified by the 
video’s initial author, moving between text and paratext to create bespoke arrangements of 
content.38  The ultimate output becomes, again, a collaboration among author, programmer, 
viewer, and technology. 
 
  
                                                 
33 See Dan L. Burk, Owning e-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 
1535, 1558-59 (2013). 
34  Paul Cobley & Nick Haeffner, Narrative Supplements: DVD and the Idea of the “Text” in NEW NARRATIVES: 
STORIES AND STORYTELLING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 170, 171 (Ruth Page & Bronwen Thomas eds., 2011).  
35  LAURA MULVEY, DEATH 24X A SECOND: STILLNESS AND THE MOVING IMAGE (2006) 
36 See Cobley & Haeffner, supra note 38 at 172. 
37 Id. at 179. 
38 Rob Cover, DVD Time: Temporality, Audience, and the New TV Culture of Digital Video, 117 MEDIA INT’L 
AUSTRALIA 137, 140 (2005); Pat Brereton, The Consumption and Use of DVDs and their Add-Ons, 13 






While narratologists have struggled to comprehend the qualities of new media, copyright 
law has struggled with much the same set of questions.  Although not all copyrighted works lend 
themselves to characterization as narrative works, narrative works clearly holds the paradigm 
position in copyright doctrine.  For example, the famous “levels of abstraction” test developed by 
Judge Learned Hand, used to distinguish idea from expression, was developed in the context of a 
narrative dramatic work, where it was employed to separate particular text from general plot 
development.39  It is far less clear how such a test works in the case of something like a map, or 
even a graphic work, which lack an obvious linear plot line, dialogue, and characters.40   It has 
been particularly challenging to apply the paradigm to works such as computer object code, 
which may not even be perceived by human audiences.41 
 
Copyright’s uneasy relationship with cybernetic narrative is for example evident in the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit written by Judge Alex Kozinski in Micro Star 
v. FormGen.42  At issue was the computer game Duke Nukem in 3-D, which like many computer 
games was organized in successive levels of increasing difficulty.  The game developer, 
FormGen, made available to its users the tools to develop alternate game levels and encouraged 
the sharing of such user-created game files on its web site.  The user-generated game levels 
existed as “MAP” files, or sets of game instructions, that could prompt the game engine software 
to draw upon a graphic library of character and object images provided with the game itself, but 
which would sequence, arrange, and display the library images in such a way as to provide a 
more challenging game experience.  Neither the graphic library nor the game engine software 
was distributed with the MAP files; they were instead part of the game as distributed by the 
publisher. Thus, the MAP files operated together with other components of the Duke Nukem 
game, but could not themselves independently generate game output, lacking the necessary 
content to do so. 
 
The defendant in the lawsuit, Micro Star, had gathered the user-generated MAP files 
from the FormGen web site and was distributing a collection of them on CD.  FormGen objected 
to this use of the material but was left in a somewhat unusual position with regard to enforcing 
the copyright: FormGen was not the author of the MAP files, and none of FormGen’s content 
was explicitly incorporated into the MAP files – the unauthorized copying and distribution was 
copying and distribution of user, rather than publisher, content.  If none of FormGen’s 
expression were found in the files, FormGen had no infringement claim. In order to have 
standing to challenge Micro Star’s activity, Form Gen had to show some authorial interest in the 
appropriated files; it therefore argued that the files were derivative works based upon the Duke 
Nukem in 3-D game.   
                                                 
39  See Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). 
40  Even Judge Hand appeared to recognize this problem, see Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 
F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.1960) (admitting that “In the case of designs” as opposed to textual works, the test “is if 
possible even more intangible.”). 
41  Compare Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) (analogizing 
computer code to narrative works) with Computer Associates v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693  (2d Cir. 1992) (finding the 
levels of abstraction test as applied to computer code too “metaphysical”). 




This argument entailed a related but different problem: the copied MAP files contained 
no content derived from the Duke Nukem game; rather, they instructed the game engine where 
and how to deploy content from a library of game graphics that was external to the copied files.  
Nonetheless in an opinion by Judge Kozinski, the court accepted the characterization of the MAP 
files as derivative works, holding that they were in some sense “sequels” to the Duke Nukem 
game, entitled to the same copyright consideration as sequels to stories in more familiar formats 
such as print or motion pictures.  On this theory, the MAP files were characterized as 
constituting a kind of narrative.  According to Kozinski, the work infringed by the unauthorized 
MAP file copies was the “story” of Duke Nukem as depicted through the audiovisual output of 
the computer game, and by “describing” the placement and arrangement of the graphics in those 




Kozinski’s opinion in Micro Star is striking for a variety of features:  not only his 
characterization of computer code as a type of storytelling, and his explicit equation of a 
derivative work with the instructions for preparing a derivative work, but also his comparison of 
written and graphic works.  Kozinski draws an explicit comparison between his coded software 
narratives and other texts, asserting that “A book about Duke Nukem would infringe for the same 
reason, even if it contained no pictures.”43   
 
However, this equation of graphic and scriptoral texts is belied by the treatment of such 
works in other cases.  Copyright tends toward a textual paradigm.  I have noted in previous work 
that copyright suffers from the lack of a theory of visual semiotics;44 indeed, copyright generally 
lacks robust doctrinal tools that would allow adjudicators to map the creative features of one 
class of works onto analogous expression in another.  It is difficult to know, for example, the 
extent to which a visual illustration or sonic tone poem based on a literary work is derivative of 
that work; Led Zepplin’s “Ramble On” may be based on Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, but it is 
unclear that any of the trilogy’s expression, other than the reference or allusion, has actually been 
recast into a musical composition.45 
 
Rebecca Tushnet has further observed that copyright law tends to privilege literary texts 
over other texts, specifically, with regard to visual depictions of creative works.46  In particular 
she critiques the copyright analysis of Judge Richard Posner in the Gaiman v. McFarlane47 
opinion, where he was called upon to assess the respective authorial contributions of comic book 
writer and comic book artist.  Although applied to a form of print media, Posner’s approach in 
the case partially illuminates and potentially complicates the issues surrounding construction of 
programmed “narratives” such as the Micro Star MAP files.   
 
                                                 
43  Id. at  1112. 
44 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9. LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 35-36 (2005). 
45 See DAVE LEWIS, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC OF LED ZEPPLIN (1994). 
46 Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012). 
47 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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Posner’s opinion holds that a writer who gives a textual description of a character, and an 
illustrator who instantiates the description as an image, are joint authors of the final work. Posner 
somewhat ironically reaches that result by discounting the visual detail of the image. He suggests 
that much of the detail of a literary figure is supplied by the imagination of the reader – a theory 
of expression that almost, but not quite, incorporates reader-response theory into the law of 
copyright.48  “A reader of unillustrated fiction completes the work in his mind; the reader of a 
comic book or the viewer of a movie is passive,” he opines.  Thus, as writer, “Gaiman's 
contribution  . . . had expressive content without which Cogliostro [the comic book figure] 
wouldn't have been a character at all, but merely a drawing.”   
 
Visual depictions, Posner argues, are more concrete and detailed than literary depictions, 
leaving less to the imagination of the reader.  Strangely at odds with Posner’s reasoning, some 
courts have in fact followed this logic to conclude that visual depictions of characters garner 
stronger copyright protection.49  But the corollary in Posner’s mind is that because more of the 
detail in a visual depiction is supplied by illustration, the artist is largely engaged in executing 
the instructions of the writer.50  It is the medium that engages the response of the reader – or the 
artist – that confers copyright authority. 
 
Posner’s analysis of visual execution of textual instructions carries some peculiar 
implications for computer game performances.  All of the visual depictions in a video game are 
in some sense the product of a literary composition -- scripted by the programmers who coded 
the game.  As Phil Agre has observed, modern digital computer technology is a technology that 
is quite literally – in several senses of that word -- inscribed with writing.51  One corollary of this 
quality is that anything that can be described in written form can be instantiated as computer 
code.52  In the case of computer games, once execution of the code is initiated by a user, those 
descriptions become audiovisual output.  This quality plays out in an interesting fashion in a 
context such as the Micro Star situation, where the roles of game publisher, programmer, and 
user are assumed by different entities than those who typically adopt these roles in the context of 
mass-market video games; i.e., in creating MAP files, Duke Nukem players may also be 
programmers, while the game publisher may become the consumer of player modifications.   
 
Following Posner, the logical reading of the Micro Star decision would be that 
programming constitutes the relevant authorship for copyright video game output.  The MAP 
files created by Duke Nukem players were a type of game programming; they designated the 
proper selection, sequence, and arrangement of elements from the library of visual game objects.  
Kozinski treats such scripts as a form of narrative, specifying the details of sequels to the 
software publisher’s Duke Nukem game story.  Kozinksi’s opinion does not delve into the 
                                                 
48 See Laura Heymann,  Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 
(2008).  Somewhat ironically, Judge Posner has in the past expressed his disdain for poststructuralist analyses in 
law.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 216 (1988). 
49 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978); Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 
WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
50  360 F.3d at 658-59. 
51 Phil Agre, Internet Research: For and Against in INTERNET RESEARCH ANNUAL: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 





relative contributions comprising such derivative works, but the game levels generated by the 
MAP files comprise visual objects specified by the game designers, arranged by the MAP scripts 
specified by game fans.  When Kozinski’s view on narrative is combined with Posner’s view on 
visual character depictions, we might conclude that the MAP file programmers are the authors of 
the sequels, which were merely given form by means of the images available in the library 
supplied by the published game.  
 
But on any plausible view of computer gaming, the MAP files constitute an exceedingly 
unusual type of narrative.  Kozinski’s assertion notwithstanding, the files are at best the 
possibility of a narrative; they are tools that can be used to generate action, sequence, and plot, 
but no one reviewing the code, even if familiar with the coding language, could discern the story 
from the computer script. Only in the context of the machine, including the other software 
libraries that are called up to populate the screen, do the files become narrative – in other words, 
there is no narrative until the MAP files are engaged in Friedman’s cybernetic circuit.  MAP files 
do not play themselves; they can only become a Duke Nukem “sequel” if engaged and utilized 
by a player.  Kozinski brushes aside the role of the player as irrelevant to the legal analysis53, but 
static MAP files are manifestly incomplete, they specify selections and arrangements that can 
only be realized when the game is in play and images are drawn from the game library.   
 
This makes explicit the role of reader – which is here to say, player – in joint creation of a 
narrative, which poststructuralists long ago identified, and which copyright critics have lauded in 
the context of written text.54  One might similarly say that in some sense a book or short story is 
merely the possibility of a narrative, and remains incomplete until someone reads them.  Literary 
texts, too, must be engaged by a reader, which is part of Posner’s point regarding the imaginative 
detail supplied by a reader.  Texts do not read themselves, just as MAP files do not play 
themselves. 
 
Indeed, following Posner’s analysis, the game player may contribute far more to the 
narrative than the literary text reader.  It may be that the reader is imaginatively filling in details 
left unspecified by the text’s author, but except for the outlier genre of “choose your own” 
multiple ending stories, readers typically do not have the freedom to direct the described 
trajectory of characters’ movements and choices, and ultimately the story outcome.  Game 
players typically do have such freedom to a greater or lesser degree, as commentators on digital 
narrative have noted.  If, as Posner intimates, the reader of a text imaginatively fills in 
unspecified visual details, then surely the player of a Duke Nukem game level imaginatively fills 
in unspecified action.  Players in this sense “write” the sequels, making the creator of the MAP 
file, let alone the publisher of the constituent images, at best a part of the scripting team.  If video 
performances are about “narrative” in the sense that Kozinski employs the term in Micro Star, 




                                                 
53 154 F.3d at 1113. 
54  See Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 725 (1992); Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding Rights, 68 CHI-KENT L. 





As I have mentioned above, new media theories of narrative have been applied outside 
the context of computer games, to media such as DVDs.  In the copyright context, this work is 
implicated in the controversy over “family friendly” or sanitized versions of popular films.55  
While a number of firms attempted to provide bowdlerized versions of popular films by altering 
the physical medium on which the film was distributed, or by reproducing edited versions of the 
film,56 a firm called ClearPlay adopted a different approach: altering the playback of the films.57  
Using the skipping, fast forwarding, and other playback controls built into DVD media, 
ClearPlay programmed the film playback so as to eliminate objectionable language and scenes 
without changing the underlying instantiation of the work.58  From a copyright standpoint, this 
alteration of the device’s output took advantage of an ambiguity in the American statute, which 
leaves open the question as to whether derivative works must be fixed; circuit courts have taken 
different positions on the question.   
 
Notably, in Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo,59 the Ninth Circuit court of appeals held that 
a device that changed the output of a game in order to create a more challenging play mode, but 
which did not change the underlying code of the game, did not create an infringing derivative 
work.  Since ClearPlay’s strategy also altered output but not the underlying DVD, one might 
expect a court would reach the same conclusion.  But as previous commentators have noted, it is 
fairly difficult to square the logic of Galoob with that of MicroStar.60  The MicroStar MAP files, 
like the Galoob Game Genie, produced novel output from the Duke Nukem game engine and 
game library, without altering the underlying code of the game.  One might attempt to 
distinguish Galoob in that no instructional “sequels” to the game were traded; the Game Genie 
instructions were variable, depending on the settings adopted for a given game by the player.61  
The MicroStar MAP files constituted permanent instantiations of the instructions for changing 
the game output.  But the fixation of the instructions for creating a derivative work, rather than 
the fixation of the derivative work itself, seems a dubious distinction. 
 
There is of course a fairly clear parallel between the ClearPlay masking software and the 
alternative MAP files for Duke Nukem in 3-D.62  Much as the MAP files constituted instructions 
for accessing and displaying data objects in the pre-existing game library, so the ClearPlay 
software constituted instructions for accessing and displaying coded video film works.  On 
Kozinski’s MicroStar logic, the ClearPlay files would presumably constitute some type of 
                                                 
55 See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright's Derivative Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 
1505, 1536 (2013) 
56 Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006). 
57 See Peter Decherney,  Auterism on Trial: Moral Rights and Films on Television, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 273, 326-28 
(describing ClearPlay services). 
58 See Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works, and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form (GEN) of 
the Alleged Derivative Work Matter? , 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 991 (2004). 
59  964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
60  See Ochoa, supra note 59 at 1031-32; Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Paratext in On-Line Gaming in EMERGING 
ETHICAL ISSUES OF LIFE IN VIRTUAL WORLDS 33, 46 (Charles Wankel & Sean Malleck eds., 2010). 
61 Kozinski’s opinion in Micro Star in fact adopts this distinction.  See 964 F.2d at 1111-12. 
62 See Ochoa, supra note 59 at 1036-37. 
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sequel, or derivative work of the films they were intended to accompany.63  But the concern 
regarding ClearPlay was never whether the masking files constituted unauthorized derivative 
works or “sequels”; the concern was that the output generated by the combination of the masking 
files and the playback hardware constituted an unfixed and unauthorized derivative work. 
 
The applicability of the ClearPlay doctrinal work-around was never fully tested, as the 
controversy over “family friendly” movie playback prompted a Congressional exemption for the 
ClearPlay model via legislation.64  But for analytical purposes, the copyright positions 
surrounding the dispute provide a useful foil to the judicial opinions I have examined above, and 
to what I have said regarding narrative theorizing regarding DVD playback.  To be sure, the 
ClearPlay viewing experience would not seem ergodic, or interactive; viewers simply watched 
the DVD output once the program was loaded, leaving the alterations to the device.  Rather, 
ClearPlay’s programming to some degree automated the playback control that might otherwise 
have been exercised by a viewer with preternaturally quick reflexes and a remote control device.   
 
One might imagine a vigilant parent, following a written script supplied by ClearPlay or 
another editing service, rapidly hitting the skip, mute, or fast forward controls on the DVD player 
as the playback of a movie approached the time marks of objectionable material.  Naturally, an 
individual monitoring the playback, even with advance warning, might miss a few items or 
fumble the timing of an omission. Programming the playback device placed the output editing 
functions into the hands of a programmer rather than the viewer.  The clear implication is that the 
confluence of author, user, and technology along cybernetic circuit is not binary, not simply 
either present or absent.  It rather lies on a continuum defined along axes representing the 
engagement of the programmer, the apparatus, and the user.  ClearPlay’s sanitized programming 
anchors one quadrant of the continuum, in which the user’s input is minimized and the 
interaction of programmer and device is maximized.   
 
In other instantiations, the apparatus or the user may be dominant.  Stability and 
continuity in computer games, particularly large-scale virtual worlds such as MMOs, depends 
upon an operational database that contains the past and present state of the output to be 
generated.65  Computer game players continually re-write the database as they generate their 
particular arcs through the hypernarrative.66  Absent unauthorized hacking, this re-inscription 
generally follows the relationships specified by the initial programmer, but in some instances the 
audience may re-write narrative relationships as well.  The Duke Nukem MAP file creators were 
engaged in what Marie-Laure Ryan terms “meta-interactivity” not merely playing according to 
the game’s internal logic, but externally re-arranging the infrastructure of the game to create new 
narrative possibilities.67  Similarly, “modding” or re-coding of game interfaces is a common and 
                                                 
63  See Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 519, 543 
(2006). 
64  Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218, 223-224. 
65  See Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Paratext in Computer Gaming in EMERGING ETHICAL ISSUES OF LIFE IN 
VIRTUAL WORLDS 33, 41(Charles Wankel & Shaun K. Malleck eds., 2010). 
66  See id at 45. 
67  Marie-Laure Ryan, The Interactive Onion: Layers of User Participation in Digital Narrative Texts in NEW 
NARRATIVES, supra note 38 at 35, 59. 
13 
 






Read against one another, the cases I have reviewed above suggest a difference in 
copyright treatment between discourse and story.69  This seems particularly striking in the 
juxtaposition of the ClearPlay and MicroStar scenarios: ClearPlay’s masking files altered the 
discursive presentation of film works, but not the internal relationships of the narratives 
presented.   The Duke Nukem MAP file coding, however, directed new internal relationships 
within the game levels.  This distinction seems borne out by other copyright cases dealing 
specifically with the re-arrangement of narrative “facts” into alternate formats, whether or not 
these formats appear in digital media.  In Manovich’s terms, one case considered the legal 
propriety of alterations to the database, the other the legal propriety of new paths through the 
existing database. 
 
Once viewed in this light, copyright’s treatment of narrative relationships is clearly not 
confined to new media.  For example, the internal consistency of narrative diegetics have long 
produced communities of fans steeped in the lore of a particular series of related works: 
aficionados of Sherlock Holmes, or the Lord of the Rings, or the Star Trek television series 
become expert at the diegetic relationships of their chosen narrative.  The question of copyright 
in such internal trivia, apart from the copyright in any particular work, has been the source of 
ongoing difficulty in copyright doctrine.  Thus, in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol 
Publishing Group the creators of the television situation comedy series Seinfeld alleged 
copyright infringement against the publishers of the “Seinfeld Aptitude Test,” or “SAT,” a book 
comprising a set of quizzes about the characters, events, and internal details of the television 
program.70  The producers of the show prevailed on a theory that the series of questions in the 
book were “substantially similar” to the “Seinfeld” program. 
 
What is striking about this holding is that the SAT was clearly not a substitute for any 
aspect of the “Seinfeld” television program.  Substantial similarity requires a comparison 
between the allegedly infringing work and the protected work.  But to what was the SAT 
substantially similar?  The SAT certainly was not a reproduction of any existing episode of the 
television show, nor did it offer any new stories or representations of the characters, plots, 
settings, or premises of the show.  It was not a new episode of “Seinfeld,” neither was it a novel, 
play, poem, or other narrative work based on the elements of the show.  To the extent that the 
Test “copied” elements of the show, it did so in a disaggregated form, taking discrete 
occurrences from the programs’ narratives and recasting them as multiple choice questions. 
 
                                                 
68  Walt Scacchi, Computer Game Mods, Modders, Modding, and the Mod Scene, 15 FIRST MONDAY (2010)  
<http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2965/2526 >; Yong Ming Kow & Bonnie Nardi, Who Owns the Mods?, 15 
FIRST MONDAY (2010) < http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2971/2529 >. 
69 See supra notes 7 - 9 and accompanying text. 
70 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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Much the same set of issues was again litigated with regard to the “Harry Potter 
Lexicon,” an encyclopedic collection of regarding the plots, characters, and milieu of the popular 
“Harry Potter” fantasy novels.71  Fans of the books assembled information drawn from the 
novels into an encyclopedic form that was published initially on the Internet, with plans for 
subsequent hardcopy publication.  As in the Castle Rock case, the court hearing Rowling’s 
complaint held that the re-formatting of material from the Potter books into encyclopedic form 
produced a “substantially similar” work that infringed the books.  But again, the Lexicon did not 
resemble any existing Harry Potter novel; it rather re-organized diegetic “facts” from the book 
into an alphabetical subject compendium. 
 
The Seinfeld quiz or the Harry Potter Lexicon are immediately recognizable to those who 
know the television series or the novels as related to those series.  At the same time, for 
copyright purposes, the nature of the substantial similarity between the unauthorized works and 
the series is elusive. A Seinfeld quiz or a Potter encyclopedia is not a sequel in any normal sense 
of the word; they are not narratives themselves but are rather reliant on the underlying narratives 
from which the particulate story concepts that make up their text are drawn.   They organize and 
evoke “facts” embedded in the respective audiovisual or literary works.72   
 
Both the SAT and the Lexicon maintain the internal coherence of the works from which 
they draw; they present diegetic facts in their relationships to other Seinfeld or Potter facts, but 
not in the discursive sequence of the underlying works.   The finding of substantial similarity in 
such cases suggests that copyright does not lie, or at least does not necessarily lie, in the 
discourse of any particular protected work.  Courts in these cases were willing to recognize 
copyright in the internal relationships of diegetic elements, repeated across a series of discrete 
works – much as Kozinski appeard to be shielding the diegetic relationships of the Duke Nukem 





The discussion above highlights the way in which recent insights from narratology might 
be deployed to address persistent doctrinal problems in copyright, particularly the treatment of 
user intervention into the structuring of story or of discourse.73  This approach opens a number of 
new conversations, but here I outline two that seem to me most compelling.  The first of these 
concerns copyright and Manovich’s observation regarding the database or algorithm as the basis 
of digital genre.74   
 
In previous work I have observed, somewhat in parallel with Manovich’s observation 
regarding new media, that the database structure of digitized works poses a challenge for 
copyright.75  Within the lexicon of copyright, databases are regarded as compilations.  Copyright 
                                                 
71 Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. and J. K. Rowling v. RDR Books, 575 F.Supp.2d 513 (SDNY 2008). 
72 See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 87 
(2007). 
73 Cf. Ryan, supra note 68 at 40 (constrasting user interactivity at the level of discourse with peripheral and story 
interactivity). 
74 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
75 Dan L. Burk, The Mereology of Digital Copyright, 18 FORDHAM INT. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711 (2008). 
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in a compilation will lie in the original selection and arrangements of the constituent elements.  
Databases could be considered as series of sequences of bits, or as the collections of digital 
objects represented by such objects.  When considered at the level of bits, only the selection and 
arrangement is potentially copyrightable, as individual bits will not be.  Even the selection and 
arrangement may lack copyright if the ordering is unoriginal or dictated by function, which it 
often will be.  Often the same analysis will hold at the level of database’s constituent data objects 
if they are individually ineligible for copyright. 
 
But as I have also pointed out, all copyrighted works are ultimately compilations at some 
reductionist level of scrutiny; the digitized database is only the most recent and most obvious 
manifestation of this reality.76  Copyrighted works are built up of words, letters, pixels, pigments, 
notes, movements, and other fungible elements that are themselves too fundamental and 
interchangeable to be individually the subject of copyright.77   This reductionist paradox is 
inherent in all copyrightable works; the protected work is always composed of building blocks 
that are themselves excluded from copyright.   
 
When compiled or assembled into original patterns, fungible components may constitute 
a work of authorship, but originality seems to depend on relationships viewed at a holistic level. 
It is only at some magical undefined moment of combination that original selection and 
arrangement triggers the attachment of authorship to the compilation.  Yet this creates its own 
conundrum: the selection and arrangement of the building blocks is itself an idea, and 
fundamental copyright doctrine holds ideas unprotectable, leaving nothing in the compilation 
subject to copyright. Copyright appears to operate only at some intermediate level of scrutiny.  
Viewing the work at too high a level of abstraction yields only unprotectable ideas; viewing the 
work at too fine a level of abstraction yields only collections of unprotectable components. 
 
This was potentially a problem in any medium, but such textual atomism becomes 
unavoidably pronounced in digital media since, as Hayles notes, fragmentation and 
recombination are intrinsic to the technical structure of such media.78  Much of the analysis in 
the cases I have reviewed here seems oriented to avoid such conundra of an authorless work.  
Gaiman’s textual description of the comic book characters was argued to constitute either stock 
characters or abstract ideas, neither of which is protectable in copyright.  If we concede that only 
when the ideas of the writer are combined with the pencil renderings, inking, and coloring of 
contributing artists do we have a copyrightable character, then none of the distinctive characters 
in literature would be covered by copyright and that does not seem the correct outcome, leading 
Posner to his surprising treatment of individual contributions.   
 
Similarly, the MAP files in Micro Star, standing alone, were devoid of any audiovisual 
content, but rather constituted lines of functional code that were unlikely to encompass 
protectable expression, and at any rate would not have constituted Micro Star’s protectable 
expression.  If the library files drawn upon by the MAP files had also been unprotectable – for 
                                                 
76 Id. at 737-39. 
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example, constituting stock characters or public domain characters – then no element underlying 
the audiovisual output of the game would be copyrightable, and yet the resulting game levels 
themselves seemed clearly copyrightable.  Characterizing them as “sequels” to the underlying 
game attempts to sidestep the conundrum.   
 
 This observation leads to a second research pathway following from the juxtaposition of 
narrative and database, considering how copyright handles the cloud of digitally generated works 
that Manovich dubs “hypernarrative.”79  Here we must focus upon the material order and 
sequencing of the text, as copyright hinges upon the act of fixation -- the moment in which the 
Platonic idealized and intangible form of the underlying work is fixed for more than a transitory 
duration in a tangible medium, and the moment at which the copyright attaches.80  (Some caution 
is required here as the legal terminology of “the work” is not quite coterminous with the usage of 
the same term in narratology distinguishing “work” from “text.”)  This convention likely harks 
back to earlier media in which fixation was an expensive and relatively rare occurrence; 
handwritten drafts, or even typewritten drafts involved considerable labor and in some eras 
perhaps relatively costly materials.   
 
Thus Manovich observes that “Old media involved a human creator who manually 
assembled textual, visual, and/or audio elements into a particular composition or sequence.  This 
sequence was stored in some material, its order determined once and for all.”81  However, 
“Instead of identical copies, a new media object typically gives rise to many different versions.  
And rather than being created completely by a human author, these versions are often in part 
automatically assembled by a computer.”82  The copyright problem in contemplating cybertexts 
thus is to ask which fixation of which version garners copyright.  Determining the moment of 
fixation was always something of a theoretical problem, as word after word was added to the 
material instantiation of a text, over time producing endless derivatives of whatever had come 
before.  But typically drafts at some point came to rest, if not to completion, yielding a relatively 
small number of stable variants on the text. 
 
Data processing power now automates the storage and retrieval of drafts, producing 
multiple versions of the work; the texts in question are effectively works continually in 
progress.83   Friedman’s cybernetic circuit occurs not only in conjunction with the malleable 
output of computer games, but in conjunction with other computer-mediated textual systems, 
such as the word processor I am employing now.  Recognition of the reader’s or player’s role in 
the cybernetic circuit in some senses produces an inherently unstable text, with a different 
meanings ascribed to the material product depending on which reader engages it.  In copyright 
terms, this generates an endless series of unfixed derivative works, depending upon who the 
reader may be; indeed the same reader at different times may bring different interpretations to 
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the text.  Narrative, or hypernarrative, lies in the sequencing of such relationships, arrayed by the 
programmer, accessed through technical apparatus, and collated by the user. 
 
A number of copyright cases considering digital media have held or implied that the 
spatial arrangement of the element matters for purposes of defining a “copy” or a 
“publication.”84  This probably makes little sense in a world of random access memory and 
distributed storage, where the elements of a work, such as MAP files and graphic files are stored 
in formats that bear no spatial or temporal resemblance to the output they produce in 
combination.  But copyright assumptions about narrative, as articulated by Kozinski and Posner, 
seem to require a sequence defined by causality and chronology, and perhaps materiality, rather 
than arising out of random access.  Thus current copyright aspires towards a particular stable 
product rather than process.  Such stable products support the classic conceptions of authorship 





This paper’s very brief juxtaposition of narratology and copyright shows the parallel 
challenges that have developed in each field.  In each discipline, the advent of digital media has 
challenged accepted constructs, revealing not simply the inadequacy of existing paradigms when 
applications to new media, but the inadequacy of the underlying premises for traditional media.  
These parallel challenges stem from common assumptions, pointing to copyright doctrine’s 
reliance on classical, and increasingly unworkable concepts of narrative.  But by the same token, 
new developments in narratology may point the way to useful reconsideration of the legacy 
assumptions underlying modern copyright.  
 
                                                 
84 See Burk, supra note 7 at 734-37. 
